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“All right,” said the Cat; and 
this time it vanished quite slowly, 
beginning with the end of the tail, and 
ending with the grin, which remained 
some time after the rest of it had gone.
Lewis Caroll, Alice in Wonderland
Introduction
  Eric Hobsbawm, the famous British historian, once chose Austria as an example of the 
inverse relationship between “the supply of good economists” and “the fortunes of national 
economies”: 
Pre-1938 Austria, where such theorists were plentiful, distinguished and consulted by 
governments, was not an advertisement for economic success until after 1945 when, as 
it happens, it had lost all its distinguished older theorists without acquiring comparable 
replacements.1
This quotation hints at the question to be dealt with in this paper, namely, the extent to which 
Austrian economic policy in the 1930s was shaped by the power of Austrian liberal ideas. 
Furthermore, it suggests a possible answer, namely, that by relying on the advice given by 
the Austrian economists policy-makers fell victim to the inadequacies of orthodox economic 
thought.2 However, before we can scrutinize the relationship between economic thought and 
economic policy in the 1930s, we must identify the economists, the ideas attributed to them, 
and the point of view from which economic policy will be examined. Broadly speaking, we will 
limit our question to the influence of the so-called “Austroliberals” on Austrian economic policy 
regarding its handling of the Great Depression of the 1930s, and we will concentrate on the link 
between theory and policy as provided by the “gold standard mentality.” 3
  In the following sections, we will begin by defining more precisely these elements of 
our inquiry. Then we will try to establish the connection between the economists’ policy 
recommendations and actual economic policy, where it will be convenient to distinguish between 
two phases: the first one from 1929 to 1933—the beginning of the downturn, the Creditanstalt 
crisis and the slump into deep depression; and the second one from 1934 to 1938—the weak 
recovery under the changed conditions of the “corporate state.” 42
The Austrian Economists
  To begin, we will review briefly those Austrian economists relevant for our story.5 First, there 
is what may be termed the “liberal core” of the Austrian school of economics, whose tradition 
goes back to Carl Menger and Eugen Böhm-Bawerk.6 In the interwar period this core consisted 
of Ludwig Mises (of the third generation of the Austrian school) and Friedrich August Hayek, 
Fritz Machlup, and Gottfried Haberler (of the fourth generation)7 as well as some lesser known 
economists like Richard Strigl, Erich Schiff, and Martha Stephanie Braun,8 to name but a 
few. These economists were, at least up to the middle 1930s, the main protagonists of liberal 
economic discourse, which ranged from the debates in the numerous “private circles” existing 
outside the university to their academic and non-academic publications and pamphlets.9 Among 
them, Ludwig Mises was the dominant figure in theory as well as in policy. As the secretary (up 
to 1934) of the Chamber of Commerce  he shaped the opinion of this interest group and thereby 
influenced actual policy-making. Picturing himself in his recollections, Mises avowed: “I was 
the economist of the country.” 10 Mises also initiated the founding of the Austrian Institute for 
Business Cycle Research in 1927, which, due to grants from the Rockefeller foundation, could 
sustain some independence from interest groups and government interference and so turned into 
a significant source of policy monitoring, if not advice. Friedrich Hayek was the first director of 
the Institute, from 1927 to 1931, and Machlup and Haberler were temporarily affiliated with it. 
  Next we turn to the margin of Austroliberalism, that is, to a strand within the Austrian school 
of economics that was, in contrast, more skeptical towards liberalism than was the core of Mises 
and his followers. This part of the tradition derives from Friedrich Wieser,11 and in the 1930s 
it was represented foremost by Hans Mayer and Oskar Morgenstern. Hans Mayer, a pupil of 
Wieser, was the sole member of the Austrian school to hold a chair at the University of Vienna. 
In the 1930s, however, he spent most of his time in intrigues, and his scientific contributions as 
well as his influence on economic policy must be considered negligible.12 In the 1920s, Oskar 
Morgenstern, after a short spell under the influence of Othmar Spann, turned to the Austrian 
marginal utility school and worked as an assistant to Mayer. When he returned from a three-
year Rockefeller fellowship abroad, he joined Hayek at the Institute and finally succeeded him 
as director from 1932 until 1938. Furthermore, though formally under the supervision of Mayer, 
he in effect acted as managing editor of the Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie, the single Austrian 
(and, after 1933, German-language) economics journal of international reputation.13
  Finally, for the sake of comparison we must also take account of those Austrian economists 
who adhered to the traditions of the historical or romantic schools of thought.14 Again, we shall 
distinguish two groups. In the first one we put those influenced by Catholic social teaching, 
who later turned into faithful supporters of the Austrian corporate state. As two representative 
examples we pick out Josef Dobretsberger, who for a short time acted as Minister of Social 3
Administration and then became university professor in Graz, and Richard Kerschagl, a member 
of the State Council from 1934 to 1938 and professor at the Hochschule für Welthandel in Vienna 
starting in 1937. The economic thought of both might be characterized as syncretistic and 
theoretically not very rigorous, to put it mildly.15
  The second group is that of the so-called universalistic school, most prominently represented 
by its founder Othmar Spann and his disciple Walter Heinrich.16 Spann, professor of economics 
at the University of Vienna, was involved in a never-ending struggle with the untiring Mayer.  
Spann was the main source of an anti-liberal and anti-democratic movement, especially among 
intellectuals and academics.17 Although he was one of the leading propagators of the idea of a 
corporate state, his version was closer to the Italian style of fascism than to the homegrown one. 
Because he was more interested in the great issues (e.g. of transforming liberal democracy into 
the “true” ideal state), the specific contributions of universalistic doctrine to economic theory 
and its influence on economic policy in a narrower sense were only marginal. The influence of 
the universalistic school on economic policy is, therefore, neglected in this study. We should, 
however, be aware that members of this school might be excepted when we impute unanimity of 
opinion to Austrian economists.18
  How, then, may members of the Austrian school of economics have influenced actual 
economic policy? The first and direct way is, of course, by acting more or less formally as policy 
advisors. This is the role that Mises played with some success throughout the period from the 
beginning of the First Republic to his resignation from the Chamber in 1934. Then, in the era of 
the corporate state the position of policy advisor was to some extent filled by Oskar Morgenstern, 
one of the few members of the Austrian school remaining in Austria up to 1938.
  Yet there is another, indirect way to influence economic policy, namely, by shaping public 
opinion on economic matters. To do so, the scientific debate that proceeds in monographs 
and contributions to scientific journals must be transformed into the simple lessons and 
catchy phrases of journalism. And, indeed, the members of the Austrian school were heavily 
engaged in this activity of educating public opinion in the truths of Austrian economics. A few 
striking examples will suffice. From March 1932 to May 1934, Fritz Machlup ran a weekly 
column in the Viennese daily, Neues Wiener Tagblatt titled “Zwei Minuten Volkswirtschaft” 
(Economics in two minutes).19 Between 1931 and 1933, the same newspaper regularly published 
comments on current problems of economic policy supplied, according to a formal contract, by 
Machlup, Morgenstern and some collaborators from the Institute. These comments were partly 
anonymous, under the title “Beiträge zur wirtschaftlichen Vernunft” (Contributions to Economic 
Reason), partly signed by the authors.20 As a final example we might mention the project, on a 
much smaller scale, of Julius Meinl’s Wirtschaftliche Rundschau, where for the first year (1934) 
Morgenstern worked as managing editor.4
Austrian Economic Theory and the Gold Standard Mentality
  One of the unique features of “Austrian economics” consisted of the specific theories on 
which its adherence to the gold standard mentality rested. The common point of reference was 
that of a frictionless economy without money as laid out in the contributions of Menger and 
Böhm-Bawerk.21 In such an economy the capital market succeeded perfectly in transforming 
“true” savings into capital formation (in modern terms: investment), where the capital structure 
of the economy was described, according to “Austrian” capital theory, by the “roundaboutness” 
of production. In this sense, net investment tended to lengthen the period of production and 
thereby to make the economy more productive. The seminal contribution of Mises22—later on 
elaborated and refined by Hayek and others23—was to introduce money into this system and to 
relate it to the question of the business cycle.
  The crucial characteristic of such a money economy was that the flows of saving and 
investment now were transacted in money and intermediated mainly through the banking 
system. Changes in the stock of money, i.e., inflation and deflation, typically affected the capital 
market by adding to or subtracting from the supply of savings. Inflation, therefore, meant an 
additional “artificial” flow of capital supply that lowered the money rate of interest to a level 
below the equilibrium rate, i.e. what it would have been if only true savings were coming to the 
market, and induced an increase in investment. As the resources of the economy were supposed 
to be already fully employed, the increase in investment (i.e., the lengthening of the period of 
production) could only be realized if and as long as continuing injections of money enabled 
the entrepreneurs to bid away the factors of production from their use in the production of 
consumption goods and redirect them to the production of capital goods, the so-called process of 
forced saving. However, for a variety of reasons this situation could not be sustained indefinitely. 
Yet, as soon as inflation stopped, the funds supplied to the capital market were reduced to true 
savings, which was not sufficient for maintaining the capital structure. This was said to be 
“too roundabout,” hence the notion of  “overinvestment” and a theory to explain the onset of 
crisis. Due to “capital shortage,” which was in effect a shortage of savings, capital goods must 
be liquidated and factors of production reshuffled to the production of consumption goods; 
because of the immobility and specificity of capital goods and, possibly, labor the consequence 
was unemployment and idle capacities. Furthermore, when the banks began calling back loans, 
a process of deflation was started. However, if deflation and depression could run their course, 
equilibrium—as the “Austrians” maintained—would be safely restored. Ultimately, depression 
would lower wages sufficiently to make production again profitable and would encourage saving 
by redistributing income, so that after the necessary adjustments the deflated capital structure 
could be maintained again.24
  This cyclical explanation of the depression was supplemented by a structural one that referred 5
to a more long run perspective. This was again based on the view that the supply of true as 
opposed to forced savings was a precondition for furthering investment and economic progress, 
and, in turn, that profits are the main source of savings. In this regard, high taxes and social 
duties, budget deficits, and excessive real wages (resulting from the activity of the trade unions) 
were regarded as burdens drawing on profits and savings and eventually detrimental to economic 
growth. At the worst, these burdens might even lead to a decumulation of capital or, as the 
“Austrians” put it, to “capital consumption,” whereby worn out parts of the capital stock could not 
be replaced due to a lack of savings.25 In Machlup’s vivid description this meant: “We eat up our 
streets, our railways and our houses. We make a fire with our furniture.” 26
  Evidently, both of these “Austrian” explanations of depression and unemployment shared a 
common message with regard to policy. The business cycle approach considered the depression 
as the inevitable consequence of the boom, which in turn was caused by inflation. Therefore, as 
a consequence, a strictly non-inflationary policy was called for as a kind of prophylactic device. 
As this excluded the possibility of financing budget deficits by money creation, i.e. inflation, such 
deficits could only be financed by recourse to the capital market. In this case, however, part of 
the supply of savings would be channeled into presumably unproductive uses by the government 
instead of into profitable private investments. Furthermore, after the traumatic experience of 
hyperinflation in the 1920s, any sustained budget deficit even if financed by issuing bonds might, 
in the end, generate a self-fulfilling expectation of future inflation. Therefore, sound finance, i.e., 
budgets balanced at a low level of expenditure, was considered a necessary complement to sound 
money.
  How was this all related to the gold standard? Ideally, the aim of preventing an inflationary 
boom would be achieved by following a policy of “neutral money,” which was, apart from a few 
complications, equivalent to stabilizing the effective quantity of money (i.e., the left-hand side 
of the so-called quantity equation) or the level of factor prices (e.g., wages).27 However, when for 
lack of empirical knowledge this ideal could not be accomplished, the gold standard was seen as 
a practicable though second-best alternative. Because a gold standard meant that the gold price 
of the currency was fixed, this left little room for inflationary policy; it worked as a “golden brake” 
on credit creation. Furthermore, the gold standard system also implied a policy of no interference 
with international capital flows, so that again the central bank of a single and, moreover, small 
country did not have much leeway for manipulating the rate of interest, e.g., in pursuing a 
policy of “cheap money.” So in the view of the “Austrians” the gold standard was the best system 
available for safeguarding against inflation.28
  Due to this latter property the gold standard was also regarded as a means of securing 
confidence in monetary stability, or, as Bordo and Rockoff put it, a “good housekeeping seal of 
approval.” 29 Conversely, infringements of the gold standard were bound to shake confidence. 6
However, the problem with this confidence argument is that it is a circular one. Adherents 
to orthodox theory argued that some measures of policy (e.g., a devaluation) would shake 
confidence for fear of its negative effects because they supposed that confidence was shaped by 
orthodox theory, which predicted just these negative effects. So, indeed, the greater the success 
of orthodox theory in influencing relevant opinion, the more self-fulfilling its predictions might 
become.
  Besides these (to use anachronistic terms) macroeconomic features of the gold standard, 
two aspects of a more microeconomic nature must also be noticed. First, the gold standard had 
to fulfill not only the internal task of preventing inflation but it was supposed to serve also as 
the prerequisite for the external aim of free trade to which the “Austrians” fully subscribed. Free 
trade (meaning the absence of tariffs, export subsidies, import restrictions etc.) was considered 
both a source of growth and of an efficient allocation of resources.30 For bringing about all the 
necessary adjustments (e.g., to eliminate the disequilibria stemming from trade deficits, transfers 
or reparation payments), the “Austrians” relied on the workings of the classical mechanism, that 
is—given the fixed gold parity—flexibility of prices and wages.31
  Second, the gold standard was associated with the system of liberalism in general, not only 
with regard to foreign trade. This meant, again, minimal interference with and regulation of 
markets, e.g., in the realm of industrial policy. The Austroliberal twist on this issue was mainly 
due to Mises, who singled out the labor market and the activity of trade unions as one of the 
fields of utmost concern. In this regard the uniqueness of Mises’ hostility towards the trade 
unions must be emphasized. According to him, their capability of fixing wages was based on 
their use of force (strikes and the possibility to prevent idle workers from undercutting the 
wage bargain)32 and on the provision of state-financed unemployment benefits. In the end he 
considered the abolition of the power of the trade unions as an inevitable concomitant for the 
restoration of prosperity. 
  Furthermore, in Mises’ view liberalism was the only viable economic system. As to its rivals, 
interventionism  and socialism, neither was viable.  On the one hand, in order to fulfill its aims, 
interventionism could not stop short of outright socialismafter a never ending spiral of one 
intervention (e.g., the fixing of prices) necessitating a still graver next one.33 On the other hand, 
as he tried to prove in the so-called calculation debate, a properly working socialist system was 
impossible because of its lack of a measuring rod for balancing benefits and costs.34 Therefore, 
any deviations, even small ones, from liberalism pure and simple had to be rejected.
  To summarize, the policy goals as recommended by the “Austrian economists” consisted of 
sound money and finance, free trade, and generally free markets, where the gold standard was 
considered as a means for pursuing these goals, in particular the macroeconomic ones. This 
implied that the burden of adjustment to any disturbance had to be laid on the flexibility of 7
prices and wages as compared with the rigidity of rules to be followed by policy. “Rigid doctrines 
and flexible prices” is how P. Clarke described it, as contrasted with the “Flexible doctrines and 
rigid prices” of the Keynesian alternative.35 This set of policy prescriptions has recently been 
termed “the gold standard mentality,” 36 and it is the consensus view of economic historians (or 
at least of the economists among them) that this mentality was the decisive factor responsible for 
the depth and the length of the Great Depression. In the following section we will examine the 
extent to which Austrian economic policy conformed to that mentality and the extent to which it 
reflected the policy advice of Austroliberal economists.
The Economists and Economic Policy: The Depression
  The world economic crisis that started in 1929 as a seemingly normal cyclical downturn only 
to degenerate from 1931 onwards into the deepest depression ever experienced by the capitalist 
economic system hit the Austrian economy especially hard.37 At the bottom of the depression 
gross national product was 23% down from its pre-depression level and unemployment amounted 
to 25%.38 In this section, after a short overview, we will concentrate on economic policy and 
on the advice given by the “Austrian economists” with regard to two particularly important 
questions: the handling of the Creditanstalt crisis and its consequences, and the problem of 
deflation.
  Applying their theory, the “Austrians” 39 identified the general causes of the depression to be  
(1) overinvestment as a consequence of prior inflation, (2) capital consumption due to excessive 
taxes and social duties as a remnant from the social legislation at the beginning of the Republic, 
and, in particular, (3) high wages as a cause of unemployment. Therefore, in the first stage of the 
depression the policy recommendations of the “Austrians” were the usual ones: to cut production 
costs and to abstain from inflation.40
  In the already gloomy state of the Austrian economy the breakdown of the Creditanstalt in 
May 1931 had the effect of a first-order economic catastrophe.41 It immediately turned out that 
the bank was not just illiquid, in which case the usual lender-of-last-resort operations would have 
saved the situation, but insolvent. Thus, the choice for policy was either to accept bankruptcy 
and liquidation or to undertake a bail out – and taking account of the fact that a large part of 
Austrian industry was in some way controlled by the Creditanstalt, the government opted for the 
latter. However, until a solution was reached eventually in the bargaining with foreign owners 
as well as creditors, a run on the bank developed that soon turned into a run on the currency.42 
This left the central bank (under its president Richard Reisch) in the unfortunate position of, 
on the one hand, supplying liquidity to the Creditanstalt by increasing its bills portfolio and, 
on the other hand, of losing its exchange reserves.43 After watching the deteriorating situation 
more or less passively for almost half a year, finally, when the central bank had almost run out 8
of its reserves, the government introduced exchange controls, which quickly developed into a 
bureaucratic system that stifled Austrian foreign trade. Meanwhile, Reisch had fallen victim to 
a controversy about the limits of the central bank’s support of the Creditanstalt and was replaced 
by Viktor Kienböck, who, on short notice, returned to a restrictive policy. Finally, after the 
introduction of a moratorium on foreign payments, the Austrian government in 1933 managed 
through the Lausanne Protocol to receive a foreign loan, which was primarily used to pay back 
short-run government debts to the central bank, thereby replenishing the bank’s exchange 
reserves. The price to be paid for the loan was, however, the reestablishment of external custody 
of Austrian economic policy.
  The reaction of the “Austrian economists” to the measures taken by the government and 
the central bank were predictably negative. They were unanimous in declaring the ongoing 
increase in the bills portfolio of the central bank to be an example of irresponsible inflation 
that had to be stopped as soon as possible.44 To them the loss of reserves and the eventual 
depreciation of the Schilling clearly signaled the inflationary nature of these policies. Machlup 
rendered the “official” statement of this position in a League of Nations memorandum on the 
credit crisis.45 His paramount advice was for the central bank to intervene by no meanswithout 
inflation there would also be no threat to its exchange reserves. In order to protect illiquid 
banks from withdrawals of (foreign) deposits he considered the imposition of a moratorium 
as justified, yet in the case of insolvency (as of the Creditanstalt) there was no alternative to 
liquidation.46 In any case, if the central bank intervened and injected liquidity, it must be ready 
to accept the ensuing depreciation of the currency, i.e., it must be prepared to go off gold and 
float its currency—although Machlup regarded this outcome as decidedly inferior to the non-
interventionist policy.47 The worst Machlup envisioned a central bank could do was exactly 
what the Austrian national bank did do: to intervene and use exchange controls to prevent the 
necessary depreciation.48 Therefore, from the point of view of the “Austrians” the handling of 
the Creditanstalt crisis must be considered a disaster; in the end, economic policy preferred to 
preserve the letter instead of the substance of the gold standard.
  Now that the disaster had happened, what could be done? In effect, after Kienböck had 
replaced Reisch as president of the central bank, the “Austrian economists” staged a campaign 
intended to make the best of a bad situation, a campaign that turned out to be surprisingly 
successful—probably not only due to their own powers of persuasion but also to a little help 
from external pressure.49 The aims of this campaign were threefold. First was the restoration of a 
restrictive monetary policy. Second was the elimination of exchange controls, at least with regard 
to foreign trade, if not to financial transactions. This was the more urgent as the free-market rate 
of the Schilling50 had declined markedly in comparison with the official parity, so that trading at 
the overvalued official rate had the effect of subsidizing imports and taxing exports. Furthermore, 9
in the attempt to make these controls effective a host of regulations had to be introduced, 
which further crippled Austrian exports. And third, as a consequence of the first two steps, the 
“Austrian” economists pushed for pegging the Schilling again to a gold parity. Regarding the 
latter point, there was some controversy among the “Austrians” (and in the business community) 
about whether monetary restriction should be intensified in an attempt to return to the old 
parity—predictably this was Mises’ point of view 51—or whether some depreciation should be 
accepted.52 Finally, when all three aims were realized after a long drawn-out process, the Schilling 
was stabilized at 20% under par, which meant that it had somewhat appreciated from its lowest 
free-market level. Yet the most important aspect of this episode was not that even the adherents 
to the gold standard were ready to accept some devaluation of the currency (or, conversely, admit 
that a greater devaluation might have been helpful) but that by the fixing of a parity the exchange 
rate was reintroduced as a guide for or an intermediate target of monetary policy.53 Thus the gold 
standard, although already limping at this time, could again act as a brake to inflationary policy. 
  This points to the next subject of our inquiry: the nature of monetary policy. The main 
question here is, of course, the extent to which monetary policies in the 1930s, and in particular 
in the Kienböck era, are to be considered as deflationary. Obviously, an answer presupposes a 
clarification of terms. As already pointed out above, the contemporary meaning of inflation 
and deflation was simply that of an increase or decrease in the effective quantity of money. 
This shifts the problem to the definition of what is to be counted as money; fortunately, the 
“Austrian” position is quite clear cut in this respect. According to Machlup, “Money is what acts 
as a medium of exchange,” and therefore a broad definition of money is warranted that includes 
both currency and cash deposits, but not savings deposits.54 He contrasts this with a (too) narrow 
definition that identifies money with “central bank money,” that is, currency and the reserves held 
by the banks (see column B in Table 1 below).5510
  As a next step we will take a look at the facts as they are now known to us. Table 1 exhibits 
the development of three different monetary aggregates throughout the 1930s. Besides central 
bank money, the table shows what is now called M1, that is, currency plus cash deposits, the 
aggregate most likely to represent the definition used by the “Austrian economists,” and M2, a 
still broader aggregate that includes savings deposits also.56 To be fair, it must be noted that to 
contemporaries only data on central bank money were directly available; however, as has been 
variously pointed out, it would not have been difficult to calculate at least raw estimates of the 
other numbers.57
  In Table 1 we recognize the inflationary momentum of 1931 in the 10% increase in central 
bank money, which was, however, swiftly counteracted and more than compensated in its effects 
on the broader aggregates when the public switched out of bank deposits and into cash.58 So 
the depreciation of the Austrian currency was due less to an increase in the quantity of money 
than simply to the distrust caused by the fear of future rises in prices amidst an international 
environment of falling prices. The net result of the inflationary episode followed by stabilization 
was that the increase in central bank money had nearly been reversed, whereas the broader 
monetary aggregates had decreased by as much as 45% and 25%, respectively. Evidently, 
combined with relatively rigid prices and wages, this produced a nearly equiproportionate 
decrease in production.59 And, as can be ascertained from the table, this situation was not 
destined to improve much henceforth.11
  This was not, however, the way things were looked upon by the “Austrian economists.” 
Contrary to what might have been expected, having in mind their definition of money, they 
concentrated on the behavior of central bank money. There they saw inflation in 1931 followed 
by stabilization. Yet, as the amount of central bank money remained disproportionately high in 
comparison to production, this stabilization was always considered to be prone to a revival of 
inflation.60 Instead of taking into account the drastic decrease in bank deposits they preferred 
to stress the existence of “hoarded money,” i.e., money in the hands of the public withheld from 
transaction purposes. (For a transitional period there was indeed some such phenomenon, in 
particular with regard to abnormally high holdings of 1000-Schilling notes). Such hoards were 
seen to pose a permanent danger to monetary stability, and the Austrian central bank was warned 
to be ready to sterilize any influx of hoarded notes into circulation by a restrictive policy.61
  Although it is not certain that the “Austrians” were aware of the true extent of their 
apparently contradictory explanation of “inflation” in the face of a sharp shrinkage in the 
quantity of money (M1 or M2) and production, the closest they came to resolving this puzzle 
was to distinguish between “deflation” and “deflationary policy,” or, in Amonn’s terms, between 
“contraction” and “restriction.” 62 The latter referred to a decrease in the quantity of money 
deliberately caused by actions of the central bank, e.g., by decreasing central bank money. The 
former was thought to be a quasi-automatic process resulting from the depression, e.g., the 
shrinking of bank money as caused by the repayment or the writing off of loans. In this sense the 
“Austrians” felt justified to state that Austria certainly experienced deflation but not deflationary 
policy. For example, Machlup flatly stated that “no country has pursued a deflationary policy.” 
63 And, moreover, in their view this kind of automatic deflation was an inevitable part of the 
depression, necessary to fulfil a kind of cleansing function and to force structural adjustments 
upon the economy.64 With no recovery in sight, the stubborn refusal of the economy to behave 
accordingly was not blamed on ill-chosen remedies—that is, the passive response to automatic 
deflation—but on the economy’s lack of flexibility, in particular of wages and prices.65
  Fiscal policy followed a pattern similar to that of monetary policy. The onset of the 
depression led to a considerable budget deficit as early as 1930 that was exacerbated by the bail-
out of the Creditanstalt in the following year. Yet, as part of the deflationary turn of Austrian 
economic policy in general, an almost balanced budget was realized in 1932 by means of severe 
cuts in expenditure and the introduction of new taxes. Extraordinary circumstances—the 
eventual reconstruction of the Austrian banking system, additional expenditures in connection 
with the civil war, and a moderate program of public works—led to higher deficits in the next 
years, all tolerated by the foreign supervisors, until in 1936 under the ministry of Ludwig 
Draxler an austere budget policy was pursued once more. Thus, fiscal policy might not appear 
as unambiguously deflationary in character as monetary policy.66 Yet, it must be noted that the 12
actual budget deficit is a misleading indicator when the economy operates significantly below 
normal (or full) employment, in which case even an unchanging deficit level will aggravate 
economic fluctuations. In addition, a more expansionist policy would have been difficult to 
finance, taking into account the dearth of a domestic capital market and the refusal of the 
central bank to participate in such financing. Furthermore, when in 1933 the Trefferanleihe was 
successfully floated, the decision to use part of its proceeds for the repurchase of bills from the 
central bank obviously had a deflationary effect, equal in principle to restrictive open-market 
policy. Therefore, despite some moderate deviations from orthodoxy, the generally deflationary 
stance of fiscal policy in the 1930s cannot be questioned.
  Thus, when the Austrian economy reached the bottom of the depression in 1933, monetary 
and fiscal policy had settled for an orthodox course. However, in the aftermath of exchange 
controls foreign trade and industrial policy emerged as highly regulated fields, farther away than 
ever from the liberal ideals. Therefore, despite the ostensible return of economic policy to the 
rules of sound money and finance, the position of the “Austrian” economists was one of distrust 
and skepticism, not one of triumph.
The Dissolution: From Austroliberalism to Austropragmatism
  The following part of the paper examines the time span from 1934 onwards. It will be argued 
in this section that this year approximately marks a break in the development of “Austrian 
economics.” 67
  The primary cause for the change that the economics community underwent in these years 
was, of course, the emigration of the most prominent members of the Austrian school.68 The 
reasons for emigration were manifold, ranging from growing anti-Semitism to the push and 
pull of career opportunities in Austria and abroad. For example, Hayek emigrated in 1931 
when, on the initiative of Lionel Robbins, he was offered a professorship at the London School 
of Economics, obviously an offer too good to be rejected. Haberler spent a year (1931/32) as a 
visiting professor at Harvard and, after a short interlude in Vienna, worked for two years at the 
League of Nations in Geneva, eventually in 1936 becoming full professor at Harvard. Machlup 
spent two years as a Rockefeller fellow in the United States and Great Britain (from 1933 to 
1935), and when his habilitation was unduly delayed by the usual intrigues, he decided in 1936 
to accept an appointment as professor in Buffalo. Finally, in 1934, having reached retirement age, 
Mises took leave from the Chamber of Commerce in exchange for a professorship in Geneva.
  As a consequence, the leadership among those economists remaining in Austria switched 
from Mises (and the other core members) to the young Oskar Morgenstern.69 Morgenstern’s 
role derived from his now dominant position within the Austrian economics community. He had 
already succeeded Hayek as the director of the Institute and consequently as the editor of the 13
Monatsberichte.70 Furthermore, he was, due to the inactivity of Mayer, the sole managing editor 
of the Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie and a referee for the important Springer Verlag. Moreover, 
the Institute provided one of the rare employment opportunities for economists outside 
academia, and, due to his excellent contacts with the government as well as with the Rockefeller 
foundation, he also had control over the necessary funds.
  However, in the context of our study it is Morgenstern’s role as a policy advisor that is of 
utmost concern.71 First, in these years, in particular in 1936/37, he occupied numerous official 
positions among the proliferation of such within the Austrian administration. For example, 
he worked as an official advisor to the Ministry of Commerce, giving rise to a memorandum 
on the choice of transport system (railroads vs. automobiles), and as a member of the price 
commission.72 Yet, to judge from Morgenstern’s diary, it was the informal relations that mattered 
most. In this regard two connections stand out. On the one hand, he was very close to the 
president of the Austrian central bank, Kienböck, who dominated Austrian economic policy in 
general,73 and, during the period of a decidedly austere budgetary policy, to the Austrian minister 
of finance, Draxler. It is in this time span that he supplied the government with a memorandum 
on the policy alternatives in the face of the devaluation of the gold bloc currencies. On the other 
hand, he was also a member of the (partly overlapping) circle of Julius Meinl, who relentlessly 
pursued the quest for a less tightly regulated and more liberal economy.74 Although Morgenstern 
seems to have been open in all directions, an attempt to relate him to parts of the Heimwehr 
failed because he considered their proposals too “dreadful.” 75
  The crucial aspect of this transition from Mises to Morgenstern was that Morgenstern turned 
away to some extent from the foundations on which the Austrian school had based its policy 
advice. This change took place on different levels. Most importantly, Morgenstern rejected the 
aprioristic foundation of liberalism advocated by Mises.  Instead, he argued that the validity of 
economic theories must be determined on empirical grounds and that policy advice must be 
purely technocratic, i.e., free of value judgments. Therefore, Morgenstern strongly objected to 
the idea that economic theory could “prove” the superiority of a liberal policy. To the contrary, 
in his view the economist as a policy advisor had to accept the aims that were determined by the 
political process.76 Furthermore, he endeavored to make economics an “exact science” by using 
mathematical tools, which the other “Austrians” generally abhorred.77
  With regard to the substantive issues, Morgenstern was also rather critical of some basic 
tenets of “Austrian economics.” This is highlighted when looking at the three important 
controversies in which the Austrian school was involved in the 1930s: on business cycle 
theory and policy (vs. Keynes), on capital theory (vs. Knight), and on socialist calculation (vs. 
Lange).78 Morgenstern remained largely agnostic in the last one, and he sided (in Morgenstern 
1935) with Knight against the “Austrians” on capital theory.79 His position with regard to the 14
macroeconomic debate, as we may now term it, is more ambiguous, as he rejected Keynesian 
theory as well as the expansionist policy conclusions derived from it. Yet, he did not endorse a 
specifically “Austrian” theory of the business cycle but contented himself with an eclectic notion 
of the depression being an inevitable outcome of prior inflation. In some sense his belief in 
the appropriateness of the orthodox rules persisted, although he had turned away from their 
“Austrian” foundations.80
  Even though Morgenstern’s criticism of “Austrian” and traditional theory was often 
trenchant, he did not put forward a clear-cut alternative. He directed his main efforts towards 
a mathematical treatment of economics that should account for the peculiar role he attributed 
to the elements of time and risk, and of power and interdependence in situations of imperfect 
competition—considered as typical of modern economies. In any case, in those busy days in 
the 1930s Morgenstern was not able to accomplish his aim of writing the book to revolutionize 
economic theory; yet, some of his ideas found their way into the mainstream critique contained 
in the introduction to the Theory of Games. 81
  Having noted these developments within Austrian economics, we must now take account 
of the fact that the major event of 1933/34 in the political sphere was, of course, the end of 
democracy and the erection of the corporate state.82 Therefore, it appears legitimate to comment 
briefly on the relationship of the Austrian school to democracy and to the corporate state, 
respectively.
  The position of the Austroliberals is ambiguous at least. To begin with, Mises professed 
himself an adherent to democracy as the only political system consistent with liberalism, in 
contrast with dictatorship or a corporate state, which he rejected because they ultimately cannot 
safeguard against the danger of civil war and revolution.83 However, his position became blurred 
as soon as he distinguished between democracy proper—that is, one enlightened by the spirit of 
liberalism—and that kind of democracy that is dominated by political parties in pursuit of special 
interests.84 In any case, in Mises’ view, Austrian democracy was permeated not only by special 
interests but by the descent into socialism and the use of violence, so it could not prove viable. 
This view was attested to by Machlup, who, in a speech on the “Political Situation of Austria,” 
described Austrian democracy as one in which the conservative majority was not allowed to 
govern due to the leftists’ threats of force.85 On the other hand, the Austroliberals entertained 
no illusions about the corporate state. For example Max Mintz, a member of the Mises seminar, 
characterized the corporate state by its “clericalism” and “lack of economic freedom”: “Never in 
the last 80 years was political and economic liberalism as dead as now.” 86
  Morgenstern added a distinctive shade to the “Austrian” view. Drawing on his Grenzen der 
Wirtschaftspolitik, he argued for the necessity of a strong state to discipline the special interests 
otherwise prevailing. In particular, he considered democracies as less able than autocratic 15
governments to take the necessary steps in case of a deep depression, e.g., to execute sharp cuts 
in the budget.87 In this regard his judgment echoed that of those responsible for the end of 
parliamentary democracy in Austria.88 Moreover, he maintained “that an absolutist-autocratic 
form of government, far from being necessarily inconsistent with a liberal economic policy, 
actually gives it ... much better chances than it has elsewhere.” Yet, the economic policy of an 
authoritarian state might face the danger “that a particular group... will obtain control over 
the government and then use it shamelessly to its own advantage, or simply that there will be 
incapable, ignorant people and charlatans at the helm who may do untold harm out of their 
lack of understanding.” 89 In this regard there was a clear discontinuity between Mises and 
Morgenstern, the former arguing for a kind of “minimal state,” the latter for a “strong state” ready 
to intervene against the pursuit of special interests.90
  Accordingly, despite their doubts on the efficacy of Austrian-type democracy the relations of 
the members of the Austroliberal core to the corporate state were somewhat strained, whereas 
Morgenstern—and more so the devout adherents to the new form of government—did not 
feel uncomfortable in lending their expertise to the solution of day-to-day economic problems. 
Conversely, the exponents of liberalism and the policy advice they rendered were considered 
with suspicion by the new regime, which had committed itself to an anti-liberal course. Under 
these circumstances it cannot be much of a surprise that the influence of the more pronounced 
Austroliberals evaporated after 1934. Apart from the fact that only the lesser known had 
remained in Austria, their career opportunities were hurt, both inside academia, where the only 
two vacant professorships in economics were awarded to Dobretsberger (in Graz) and Kerschagl 
(at the Hochschule für Welthandel),91 and outside, in Morgenstern’s recruitment for the Institute. 
Among the younger economists affiliated with the Institute after 1934—Ernst John, Reinhard 
Kamitz, Josef Steindl, Gerhard Tintner and Abraham Wald—none had close ties to the liberal 
tradition. As a final bit of evidence we might point to the petering out of the journalistic 
activities of the “Austrians.” Machlup, for example, decided to close his regular column after the 
newspaper in too many cases refrained from publishing his contributions.92
The Economists and Economic Policy: The Recovery
  The main characteristic of the development of the Austrian economy during the regime of 
the corporate state was that the recovery from depression was weak not only in absolute terms 
but also when compared to other countries.93 In the following we will try to relate this lack of 
success in economic policy by singling out three topics: public works, the deflationary hard-
currency policy, and industrial and trade policy.
  The first topic I will address is that of public works, about which debate indeed stretched 
from the time of the Lausanne loan in July of 1931 until the end of the corporate state in 1938. 16
However, as the relevant views did not change much over time, a summary discussion is justified. 
Although there were a few attempts at fighting unemployment by public works (financed by 
parts of the proceeds from the “Trefferanleihe” of 1933, the “Arbeitsanleihe” of 1935 and the 
“Investitionsanleihe” of 1937), there was a broad consensus against them on economic grounds. 
Even when the government had opted for a public works program, at least some of its exponents, 
such as Kienböck, agreed to it only for reasons of political propaganda, not on its economic 
merits.94
  The consensus against public works presupposed that they must be financed either by loans 
or by taxes, as any other kind of financing (e.g., by taking recourse to the central bank) would be 
inflationary, with all the well-known harmful consequences. In connection with the hotly debated 
Deutsch-Vertes plan95 and the possibility of such inflationary finance for it, Haberler commented 
that the mere announcement of such a plan would already lead to a currency crisis.96 On this 
occasion the “Austrians” also dismissed the theory of the secondary effects of public works, i.e., 
an early version of Keynes’s “multiplier,” as “primitive” and “naïve.” 97
  Under non-inflationary conditions, the rejection of public works rested on two 
straightforward arguments, first, that “labor is merely shifted from one production to another” 
because “under given conditions and with a fixed wage level only a certain number of workers 
can be employed with a certain amount of capital,” 98 and, second and even worse, that profitable 
private investment is replaced by unproductive government expenditure. The “Austrians” were 
seconded in their arguments by R. Kerschagl, who attacked public works as an example of an “ill-
guided policy to use taxes and loans for investments that are from the very beginning doomed to 
yield no return,” and by J. Dobretsberger.99 Morgenstern noted with satisfaction that Kienböck 
was able to prevent the excesses of public works programs, and he reported a lecture by Wilhelm 
Röpke (one of the few expansionists among liberal economists) that was ill-received in the 
Nationalökonomische Gesellschaft.100 Morgenstern also played a role in what should turn out to be 
the final episode in this regard. When in January, 1938 Ernst John tried to place a contribution 
into the Monatsberichte that argued for some public works, he was censored following an 
intervention by Kamitz and Morgenstern (then already in the United States). Eventually, 
John’s article surprised the reader by taking an unexpected turn half-way in the argument and 
concluding with a reaffirmation of the importance of a stable currency.101
  Next we turn to monetary policy.102 As argued above, with the benefit of hindsight the data 
on broad monetary aggregates show that it was deflationary even after 1933. However, after 
the reconstruction of the Austrian banking system the peculiar characteristic of the loan and 
money market was its growing independence from central bank policy.103 As the banking system, 
dominated by the Creditanstalt, which had acquired a quasi monopolistic position, had plenty of 
reserves and was extremely cautious in granting loans, the central bank could not have exerted 17
much of an expansionist pressure even if it had intended to do so.104 Thus, loans to businesses 
remained scarce and expensive in this period. Many contemporary and present-day observers 
blamed the Creditanstalt’s monopoly behavior—raising prices and restricting quantities—as 
the main culprit, and undoubtedly there is a valid point in this view. However, such a “credit 
deadlock”105 with a high yield spread between short-term and long-term has been found to be 
a typical phenomenon, in particular in countries that experienced banking failures, even in the 
absence of a monopoly bank.106 In any case, this failure of the banking system to fulfil its task of 
intermediation was another cause contributing to the weakness of the recovery.
  The deflationary stance of monetary policy was, of course, intimately connected to the 
stabilization of the currency and an austere budget policy. In both regards 1936 was a crucial 
year. First, after the deficits in the preceding years, the ministry of Draxler achieved an almost 
balanced budget. And second, in spite of the eventual breakdown of the gold bloc (then 
consisting of France, Switzerland and the Netherlands) and the devaluation of its member 
currencies, Austria chose a policy of inaction, i.e., not to devalue but to keep the parity. These 
decisions were the more significant as they came when Austria had ultimately acquired autonomy 
in its economic policies.107
  Examining the policy advice from economists, we again start with that of Morgenstern. 
Indeed, it was just in these times that his contacts were closest to the inner circles of government, 
particularly to Kienböck and Draxler.108 Apparently, the primary message he tried to convey was 
the necessity of urgent action. Only when he felt that time was going by without any such action 
taking place did he outline his view on the currency question in a memorandum, a modified 
version of which was published.109 There Morgenstern made clear that the devaluation of the 
gold bloc in any case would impose sacrifices on the economy and that the alternative reactions 
to this event differed only in the way these burdens would be distributed. The alternatives were 
external vs. internal adjustment. External adjustment would be a devaluation of the Schilling. 
This would fail to relieve the budget (as a stable currency might do, because of the foreign 
currency denominated debt), it would undermine confidence, and, by sparking off price increases, 
it would hurt workers and alpine farmers. The preferred alternative was internal adjustment, that 
is, a policy of lowering prices, directly by means of price controls (with regard e.g. to agricultural 
prices) and indirectly by eliminating trade restrictions and opening up markets to foreign 
competition.110 The byproduct of such a policy of Auflockerung would have been a step towards 
a more liberal economic system. As it turned out, the currency was not devalued; however, to 
Morgenstern’s disappointment, none of the measures proposed for internal adjustment were 
realized to any reasonable degree. 
  Another aspect of this episode is noteworthy. In his diary of 24 July 1937 Morgenstern 
wonders that many “foreigners” have criticized the decision not to devalue. And in fact, Haberler 18
(then already at Harvard and also with some intellectual distance from the Austrian school) in 
no less than four consecutive letters to Morgenstern did firmly argue that now the time had 
come to devalue. Unfortunately, Morgenstern’s replies have not survived, yet the motives for the 
government’s decision were referred to in the same diary entry as political obstacles, especially 
those of agricultural policy.111
  However, the atmosphere of the debate on devaluation would be misrepresented if it were 
confined only to the technocratic level. In fact, the arguments for the hard currency policy were, 
as a rule, dogmatic if not delusive. A few examples will suffice. Dobretsberger, under the title 
“Conservative monetary policy-constructive economic policy,” reaffirmed the validity of the old 
rules of monetary policy, which “have nothing to do with liberalism,” as against “modern fibs,” 
and he ended up with unqualified praise: 
Austrian economic policy since March 1933, the beginning of the authoritarian state, 
represents a powerful achievement that has been fully appreciated abroad. Primarily the 
monetary policy ... is the greatest capital of our economy. 112
 Even the more coolly tempered Morgenstern did not stop short of telling of the “admiration” 
felt abroad for Austria’s monetary and financial policy: “If policy keeps to these principles in the 
future, again success cannot fail.” 113 And the Monatsberichte in 1938 gave the following picture of 
this hoped-for success: 
As a consequence of a sound monetary and a cautious credit policy and by avoiding any 
kind of overinvestment Austria has achieved a much greater stability against future crises 
than those countries that now experience a very advanced phase of an excessively stormy 
boom.114
Indeed, it is true that Austria in these years never had to worry about such a stormy boom.
  At this stage we might remark that the case for orthodox policy was based on the strength 
of orthodox opinion as well as on the weakness of the heterodox one. As not only the liberals 
but also Austromarxists (up to 1933) and the conservative adherents to the corporate state were 
hostile to “Keynesian” policies, the agitation for a reformist policy was left to monetary cranks 
and to those who were not afraid of following Nazi Germany and its economic experiments.115 
Therefore, most of the alternative proposals could be easily dismissed as irresponsible.
  Finally, we take a look at the microeconomic level: how is the policy of the corporate state 
with regard to foreign trade, agriculture and industrial relations to be evaluated from a liberal 
point of view? In this regard historians and independent contemporary observers agree that, 
contrary to its announcements, the policy of the corporate state was more than ever dominated 
by certain special interests. The special interest of prime importance was obviously that of 
agriculture, where interventions abounded.116 The aim of autarky combined with the stabilization 
of prices by controls eventually led to an intricate and overly expensive system (Marktordnung) 19
of quantity controls, export subsidies and so on, which seemed to be taken from Mises’ textbook 
description of the failure of interventionism. In any case, it was clear that the burden resulting 
from the preference granted to agriculture fell (in terms of higher prices) both on industry and on 
workers.
  Similarly, in industry the ideal of free competition was paid only lip service, whereas in 
practice the tendency towards cartelization and monopolistic behavior was strengthened.117 
On the one hand, this was furthered by the existing trade restrictions (tariffs, prohibition and 
restriction of imports) that sheltered many industries from foreign competition, and, on the 
other hand, the very institutions created by the corporate state for the sake of “self-organization” 
(Bünde, Kammern) turned out to be ideal places for planning collusive actions. The result was 
high and stable prices, which, when combined with the deflationary effect of monetary policy, 
could not but weaken the recovery. Moreover, this development on the price side contrasts 
sharply with that of wages. The weakening of the trade unions and the increased “flexibility” of 
labor markets led to a decrease in the wage bill and henceforth of consumption demand.118
  Again, Morgenstern’s response appears to be typical of most Austrian economists. As was 
already pointed out above, he acknowledged that the prevalence of imperfect competition made 
some state intervention into industrial policy inevitable; he also backed away from the earlier 
proposal of the “Austrians”of a unilateral return to free trade, deeming it unfeasible under the 
current situation of international trade and incompatible with the ideology of the corporate state. 
However, he considered the elimination of price rigidities as the only way to a stronger recovery 
and to improved international competitiveness.119 The easing of trade restrictions was the means 
that he urgently suggested. After the gold bloc devaluations, Morgenstern formulated with 
diplomatic skill:
As the competent agencies of government ever have declared that most of these measures 
only resulted from the emergency situation of the time when they were introduced, it 
must be reckoned that the Auflockerung, as it fits in with the needs of the present, will not 
be long in coming. 120
  When Morgenstern’s hopes failed, he resigned from the price commission.121 It seems that 
his interests turned away then from policy advice, and he began earnestly to consider some of the 
invitations from American universities. Eventually, in 1938, he went as a visiting professor to the 
United States, whence he would not return to Austria. Yet, in the meantime, before his departure, 
his criticism of economic policies became more sharp. In the last speech that he delivered in 
pre-Anschluss Austria, on “The conditions of Austria’s economic ability to survive,” after a short 
reference to the great successes of economic policy, he castigated the tendency to treat those 
who favored more economic freedom as enemies of the regime. Consequently, he proposed a 
more liberal trade and industrial policy, including steps toward free trade and an end to exchange 20
controls, and, in a final remark, criticized that economic policy had been determined only within 
small circles and without public discussion.122 One year later, after the Anschluss, Morgenstern’s 
characterization of the corporate state was devastating when he blamed it for “creating hosts 
of ‘corporate bodies’... the practical result [of which] is that they tend to eliminate every trace 
of new competition which might appear.” It should therefore be relegated to the “great field...  
which might appropriately be called the ‘pathology of economic policy.’” 123
Conclusion
  In this final section an overall evaluation of the power of “Austrian” ideas with respect to 
policy-making in the 1930s will be undertaken. Thereby, we take up the distinction between the 
depression and the recovery phase.
  In the depression phase, when the reputation and influence of the liberal core of the Austrian 
school certainly had reached its peak, Austria’s ability to make a policy of its own was relatively 
unconstrained, and, in fact, under the extraordinary circumstances of 1931 it exercised this 
power to diverge rather widely from the path prescribed by adherence to the gold standard. 
However, as a consequence of its policies Austria became dependent on foreign capital supplied 
by international financial institutions. The supervisory power of these institutions and the policy 
advice of the “Austrians” combined to reintroduce the gold standard policies that were willfully 
followed by Austrian economic policymakers henceforth.
  In the recovery phase, the position of the Austroliberals had severely weakened, on the one 
hand due to the emigration of their most eminent representatives, on the other hand due to the 
outright renunciation of liberalism as a doctrine by the corporate state. The policy choice of the 
corporate state might be described—by paraphrasing Clarke’s dictum quoted above—as “rigid 
doctrines and rigid prices.” In this regard the rigid doctrines represented the continued adherence 
to the gold standard rules, while the rigid prices resulted from the attempt of the corporate 
state to install a densely regulated system of production, particularly in the fields of agriculture 
and foreign trade. The first aspect was rather unanimously favored by Austrian economists, 
that is, not only by the remaining liberals among them, whereas the high level of regulation 
was obviously in direct contradiction to anything liberal economists would have advised. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that economic policy clung to the rigid doctrines of the gold 
standard even after some autonomy had been regained in 1936.
  The persistence of the gold standard mentality right to the end of Austria’s existence as 
an independent state, therefore, constitutes somewhat of a puzzle. It persisted even though in 
general the liberal tradition in Austria always had been rather weak. It persisted even after most 
of the Austroliberals had emigrated and had no way (and little intent) to influence directly 
Austrian politics. It persisted even after the League of Nations control of Austrian economic 21
policy had ceased, the gold bloc had broken down, and Austria had regained its autonomy in 
monetary policy. And, finally, it persisted although, due to the nature of the corporate state as 
a kind of “government dictatorship,” there was no need to worry much about public opinion.124 
Apparently, the gold standard mentality had acquired a life of its own and was kept alive even 
after its foundations had vanished – just like the “grin without a cat.”
  Thus, in conclusion, although the gold standard mentality owes to the “Austrian economists” 
a number of high-brow theories and low-brow propaganda pieces in its favor, holding them 
responsible for the awkward economic policy to which Austria committed itself in the 1930s 
would be a clear exaggeration of the power of their ideas. To the extent that Austrian economic 
policy in dealing with the Creditanstalt crisis could be realized autonomously, it broke many 
of the liberal rules without, however, following a clear plan. Only after supervision by foreign 
creditors became effective again did the rules of the gold standard regain their decisive influence 
on Austrian economic policy and were once more defended as a means of safeguarding monetary 
stability against the danger of inflationary excesses. Yet, at this point Austroliberalism had 
already lost much of its former grip on the policy making process. In fact, in most countries the 
gold standard mentality was only overcome when the politicians in power were overturned.125 
In this regard, the continuity of economic policy in Austria in the 1930s was a consequence of 
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